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The Munakata Clan Code of 1313
How a Clan of Hereditary Shrine Priests with Warrior Status
Modernized Their Rule and Survived in Power
Carl Steenstrup, Berlin
1. Introduction
Rapid modernization of institutions, economics, and ways of thinking helped
Japan retain its independence during and after the mid-nineteenth century
impact of the Western sea-powers. One reason why rapid modernization
succeeded was the administrative infrastructure left by the Tokugawa system,
in particular the following features: Channels existed for shogunate, daimiate,
and village authorities to communicate their orders to every citizen;1 an
efficient network of public power was present, from the village level upwards,
which functioned according to written sources of law and stored information
by means of statistics.2 The number of literate and numerate men engaged in
administration was larger than in other premodern societies because the sho-
gunate and each of the more than 260 daimiates had to build their own staffs
and each village had to have village officials who were farmers but yet had
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1 See Dan Fenno HENDERSON: “Promulgation of Tokugawa Statutes”, in The Journal of
Asian and African Studies (Leiden, Holland), Vol. I (1967), pp. 9–25. Reprinted in David
C. BUXBAUM (ed.): Traditional and Modern Institutions in Asia and Africa, Leiden (Brill)
1967, pp. 9–25.
2 See Christian WOLLSCHLAEGER: “Historical Trends of Civil Litigation in Japan, Arizona,
Sweden, and Germany. Japanese Legal Culture in the Light of Judicial Statistics”, in
Harald BAUM (ed.): Japan – Economic Success and Legal System, New York (de Gruyter)
1997, pp. 89–142, in part. pp. 111–113; and Herman OOMS: Tokugawa Village Practice.
Class, Status, Power, Law, Berkeley & London (University of California Press) 1996, pp.
110–121.
3 See Dan Fenno HENDERSON (trans. & ed.): Village “Contracts” in Tokugawa Japan. Fifty
to learn how to handle accounts and official correspondence.3 The premodern
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administrative framework was to a large extent built on written laws – an
effort-saving device which began with the 8th century Ritsuryô codes and
was never abandoned. To wit, the modern principles of “rule by law” (i.e.,
the official can do nothing to the citizen which is not permitted by the law)
or “rule of law” (i.e., the citizen has means to uphold the law against the
official) did not apply; law in Japan was always, like in modern dictatorships,
a tool in the officialdom’s hands, to be used when convenient. But as admin-
istrative superiors could always use law as a legitimation to discipline inferiors,
written laws came to play a particular role when warriors took over government
and had to keep turbulent fellow-warriors in their service from acting contrary
to their duties to their lord. Much Kamakura legislation served this aim. In
the last decades of the rule of the Hôjô clan (1203–1333), Kamakura legislation,
however, did not suffice to uphold order. Society had become monetarized,
and class divisions no longer coincided with status boundaries; there were
rich commoners and indigent warriors. Kyoto aristocrats, who had acted as
honke (patron) or ryôke (proprietor) for lands commended to them
by the original owner in order to avoid taxes, and who had in the early
middle ages secured their economic interests through legislating for the officials
and people living on the commended land, were now mostly passive capitalists.
Thus, such tasks as increasing crops (kannô ), mediating between tax-
gathering owner-occupiers (myôshu ) and their tenant tillers, allocating
shares of the land tax burden among the myôshu, and providing for markets,
fell to Kamakura’s housemen policing and deriving rent from the land, the
jitô 	. If they decided arbitrarily, they had constant complaints on their
hand, and could lose favour with the shogunate. Myôshu possessed arms, and
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Specimens with English Translation and Comments, Seattle & London (University of
Washington Press) 1975, pp. 12–13 and 20–23.
4 See Detlev TARANCZEWSKI: “Einige Aspekte der Entstehung des privaten Grundeigentums-
rechts im mittelalterlichen Japan”, in Klaus Antoni et alii (eds.): Referate des VII. Deutschen
Japanologentages in Hamburg, Hamburg (OAG) 1988 (Mitteilungen der Ostasiatischen
Gesellschaft, Vol. 111), pp. 299–308; idem: Lokale Grundherrschaft und Ackerbau in der
Kamakura-Zeit. Dargestellt anhand des Nitta no shô in der Provinz Kôzuke, Bonn 1988
(Bonner Zeitschrift für Japanologie, Vol. 10), pp. 81, 97–99, and 133; Thomas KEIRSTEAD:
The Geography of Power in Medieval Japan, Princeton (Princeton University Press)
1992, Chapter Four, “The Theater of Protest”; Bruce L. BATTEN: “Provincial Administration
in Early Japan. From Ritsuryô kokka to Ôchô kokka”, in Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies, Vol. 53 No. l (1993), pp. 103–134, in part. pp. 129–132; Kristina Kade TROOST:
“Peasants, Elites, and Villages in the Fourteenth Century”, in Jeffrey P. MASS (ed.): The
Origins of Japan’s Medieval World. Courtiers, Clerics, Warriors, and Peasants in the
the whole agricultural population was litigious and sometimes violent.4 Con-
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ditions were much different from what they were to be in the Tokugawa era,
where the warriors held a monopoly on weapons. Laying down by-laws
within the bounds of superior legislation, and announcing them, saved the
jitô trouble. Further, if he did not do so, farmers’ associations or artisans’ or
merchants’ guilds might do so, possibly against his interests; and relying
only on the Kamakura laws would not do, since they were piecemeal and not
adapted to local conditions, but to the peculiar interests of the Hôjô clan and
to the exigencies of military preparations against possible renewed Mongol
attacks.
Thus we find toward the end of Hôjô rule, besides the three usual sources
of law, namely, (1) modified Ritsuryô (kuge hô), (2) law laid down as honjo
hô 
 by honke and ryôke for that particular shôen (estate), and (3)
Kamakura law (buke hô), a new and fourth kind, namely, legislation by the
local warrior chieftain,5 adapting Kamakura legislation to local conditions
without contravening Kamakura legislation. Such by-laws are now historical
sources for local conditions. Whether they had to be registered with the
bakufu authorities, and to what extent bakufu courts took them into account,
we do not know. Probably both questions should be answered in the affirmative,
since the local warrior chieftain could gain favour with the bakufu through
demonstrating that he actively promoted orderly government (seidô ),
and since bakufu courts usually respected local customs – and the by-law
was sort of objectified local custom. The first known by-law issued by a
local warrior chieftain was that of the Utsunomiya clan of 1283.6 The next
one known – and more interesting from several points of legal history – is
that of the Munakata clan, of 1313. The Utsunomiya code is modestly called
shikijô  or “rulings”, and the Munakata Code carries the even more
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Fourteenth Century, Stanford (Stanford University Press) 1997, pp. 91–109, in part. pp.
104–106; and Astrid BROCHLOS: Grundherrschaft in Japan. Entstehung und Struktur des
Minase no shô, Wiesbaden (Harrassowitz) 2001 (Asien-und Afrika-Studien der Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin, Vol. 8), pp. 152–55.
5 See SATÔ Shin’ichi , IKEUCHI Yoshisuke , and MOMOSE Kesao 
 (trans. & ed.): Chûsei hôsei shiryô shû  ! I–III, Tokyo (Iwanami
Shoten) 1973, Vol. 3 (Buke kahô"), pp. 399–400; and KATSUMATA Shizuo #$
%& in ISHII Susumu '( et alii (eds.): Chûsei seiji shakai shisô )*+,-
(I), Tokyo (Iwanami Shoten) 1972 (Nihon shisô taikei.,-/0, Vol. 21), p. 497. In
what follows, I quote the former volume as CHSS III followed by page number, and the
latter volume as CSSS followed by page number.
6 See CHSS III, “Buke kahô I”, pp. 3–19, and “Kaidai” 12, pp. 402–407.
modest term kotogaki jôjô345 or “sectioned rulings”, thus avoiding the
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word shikimoku 6, which the bakufu had used as a modest term for its
1232 summary of leading cases, but now meant “bakufu code”.7 Below I use
the term “Code” for the Munakata by-laws – for a code was what they were
for the people on Munakata lands – rather than “by-law”, since “by-law”
gives the modern reader the impression of local legislation by a municipal
council.
Codes like that of the Utsunomiya and the Munakata clans had a great
future, for many Sengoku daimyô issued such codes, and unashamedly – as
they now held absolute power in their territories – called their codes as they
pleased, e.g. okitegaki 74 “commandments” or hatto 8 “statute”.8 In the
translation of the Munakata Code, I use the word “statute”, when the legislator
talks about his code; for what he wanted was to tighten up his rule through
new statutory law partly confirming, partly abrogating an older statutory law,
the so-called “Great Placard” of 1259 (see the Preamble, and Art. 9). Even
calling the 1313 Code a “Constitution” would not be off the mark, since the
legislator (see Art. 6, and the Epilogue) gives certain promises to his men.
Since loyalty to his son and heir, and, when he grew up, obedience to him,
was intended to be their return favour – and the son and heir actually grew
up, and ruled – there is reason to believe that the legislator intended these
promises to be binding. Deals between a prince and his barons – they promise
obedience to his designated successor, and he promises orderly government
– is a pattern well-known from medieval European history, as an institutional
bridge between elective monarchy and absolute monarchy. In Japan, Hideyoshi
besought his barons to be loyal to his young son; it did not work, since
Hideyoshi was already very ill and thus had no lever against his barons.9 In
the Munakata case, the succession arrangement worked: the ceding lord was
still powerful, and Hôjô pressure made compliance with the reforms necessary,
so as to prevent independent measures by the bakufu. The latter could always
allege defence necessity; for in case of another Mongol attack, Munakata
territory was the area nearest to the embarcation ports of the Korean peninsula.
Whether the Munakata clan could count on special consideration by the Hôjô
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7 See ISHIMODA Shô '9:; in CSSS, pp. 565–570.
8 See ISHII Ryôsuke '(<=: Nihon hôseishi gaisetsu.>?@, Tokyo (Sôbunsha)
1976, pp. 375–378.
9 See Mary Elizabeth BERRY: Hideyoshi, Cambridge & London (Harvard University Press)
1982, pp. 234–241.
rulers of the bakufu is doubtful.
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The Munakata belonged to the oldest stratum of the ruling class, while the
Hôjô were notorious upstarts. Until well into the 6th century the Munakata
had been independent rulers of an extensive territory in northwestern and
northern Kyushu, in what is now Fukuoka, Nagasaki, and Ôita-ken, comprising
also some of the islands in the open sea between Kyushu and the Korean
peninsula. The main assets of the Munakata were the fishermen and sailors
who knew these sea-lanes with their shoals and sudden storms, and shrines
of three female deities who were supposed to protect ships sailing these
sea-lanes, if sacrificed to.10 The Munakata were the hereditary overlords of
these fishermen and sailors, had insider knowledge of trade and politics of
the Korean peninsula, and were hereditary wardens, and head priests, of the
said shrines. Early emperors, notably Temmu Tennô (ruled 673–86), availed
themselves of the services of the Munakata clan, and favoured it, in particular
in its capacity of hereditary wardens and priests of the Munakata shrines,
with land grants and privileges, most of all the unusual one of being concurrently
Shinto priests and lay officials invested with judicial, financial, and adminis-
trative powers over the shrines and their sustenance lands.11 Since Shinto and
Buddhist cults were not separated, the head priest also held a high Buddhist
title.12 The imperial favours were, by the personalistic and familistic values
prevalent in Nara and Heian Japan, reasonable. One of Temmu’s consorts,
while he was still Prince Ôama /AB, was a Munakata woman, and their
son served Ôama with distinction in the civil war of 673, through which
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10 See Dictionnaire historique du Japon, s.v. “Munakata-jinja” CDE*; OKAZAKI Tadashi:
“Japan and the Continent” (trans. by Janet Goodwin), in Delmer M. BROWN (ed.): The
Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. I, Ancient Japan, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne
(Cambridge University Press) 1993, pp. 268–316, in part. pp. 312–316; HIRANO Kunio:
“The Yamato State and Korea in the Fourth and Fifth Centuries”, in Tôhô Gakkai (ed.):
Acta Asiatica, Vol. 30 (1976), pp. 51–82, in part. p. 67; and, for the oldest and most
venerated of the Munakata shrines, Dai Sanji Okinoshima Gakujutsu Chôsatai FGHI
JKLMNOP (ed.): Munakata Okinoshima CDIJK I–III, Tokyo (Yoshikawa
Kôbunkan) 1979, I: 452–454, 494–495, 620–625; and III: 3–5, 26–27, 49–53; 92–93,
112–113; 250–251; 330–331, 344–345, 350–351, 358–360, and 368–371.
11 See ISHII Susumu: “Jûyon seiki shotô ni okeru zaichi ryôshu hô no ichi keitai. Shôwa
ninen Munakata sha kotogaki jôjô oboegaki” QRS	TUVWXYZ[
\. ;]^_CD*345U`abc, in idem: Nihon chûsei kokka shi no kenkyû
.d>Zef, Tokyo (Iwanami Shoten) 1970, p. 467. In what follows, I quote
this article as “Ishii / oboegaki” plus page number.
12 Shitsuin gongyôghij, ibid. p. 467.
13 W.G. ASTON (trans. & ed.): Nihongi, Tokyo (Tuttle reprint) 1982, Part Two, pp. 309–319.
Ôama usurped the throne from his older brother.13 Accordingly, a myth was
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concocted and authorized to the effect that the Munakata goddesses were
children of the (old, earthly) God Susanoo and the (newer, heavenly) supreme
goddess Amaterasu Ômikami, whom the Tennô, too, claimed as ancestress.14
A weakness of the Munakata establishment was the absence of clear rules
of succession to the lucrative post of high priest of the Munakata shrines. As
in the early Imperial House, brothers (typically grown-up and experienced)
of the incumbent tended to demand precedence over the incumbent’s de-
scendants (typically young and inexperienced); or younger and elder brothers
both claimed to have been appointed by their dying father. In 1132, two
claimants to the post of high priest even waged a local war of succession.15
Ex-Emperor Toba (ruled as Ex-Emperor 1129–56) favoured the winner with
a decree which made his holdings personally heritable in the father / son
descent line, and with Toba and his descendants as supreme patrons. Under
Toba’s weaker successors, the patronship was actually administered by mem-
bers of the Taira clan, which after two successful civil wars lorded it over the
Imperial House from 1159 to 1184. When, in 1185, Minamoto no Yoritomo
defeated and expropriated the Taira clan, he, of course, abolished all rights
over the Munakata lands and temples held by the Taira, but did not punish
the Munakata, though they had been friends of the Taira. The wife of the last
Taira to administer the Court’s patronship over the Munakata holdings had
talked her brother-in-law Kiyomori, the Taira leader, into his ultimately fateful
decision not to kill, only to banish, young Yoritomo, whose father Kiyomori
had defeated in the 1159 civil war. Nor did Yoritomo want to antagonize the
Court, which tried to protect the Munakata clan and the shrines of which the
clan had been in charge for so long. Under Minamoto rule, the Munakata
even obtained the status of shogunal housemen (gokenin kB), and the
hereditary nature of the position of head priest was confirmed. Under Hôjô
rule (from 1203) the Munakata remained in favour with the bakufu. It granted
the shrine lands immunity from entry of the shogunal police (1204); and a
conflict with the patron, then the impetuous Ex-Emperor Go Toba (ruled as
Ex-Emperor 1198–1221) and the latter’s deputy, a Fujiwara noble, during
which the head priest was even incarcerated (1215), ended, after bakufu
intercession, with the full rehabilitation of the priest in 1217. A bakufu
Japonica Humboldtiana 7 (2003)
14 See Nelly NAUMANN: Die einheimische Religion Japans I–II, Leiden (Brill) 1988–1994
(Handbuch der Orientalistik 5/4/1/Teil 1–2), Vol. I: pp. 82–83.
15 ISHII / oboegaki, pp. 467–468.
decision of the same year laid down that the Munakata clan was to retain full
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police and judicial power over shrine land inhabitants. With the defeat and
exile of Go Toba at the hands of the bakufu in 1221, Court patronage and
Court interference came, at least temporarily, to an end. The strengthened
bakufu, however, installed one of the bakufu’s leading politicians, Miura
Yasumura Glmn, as financial controller of Munakata lands.16 When the
Hôjô exterminated the Miura clan in 1247, the position of the Munakata clan
became complicated: The bakufu, at this time in a cooperative mood towards
the Court, allowed Ex-Emperors and their consorts to be patrons of, and thus
to derive income, from Munakata lands, but in reality exercised tight control
not only over Munakata administration, but even over matters of worship;
from 1255 the Munakata shrine priests were officially obliged to pray not
only for peace and welfare of the country, but also for the welfare of their
overlords in the bakufu.
After the fall of the Miura in 1247, Court influence over the Munakata
shrines and lands revived in a roundabout manner. The rather dictatorial
Miura Yasumura had alienated shrine lands. These were redistributed together
with other Miura possessions. The influential courtier Saionji Saneuji opq
rs (1194–1269, son of a niece of Yoritomo) represented the bakufu at the
Court, and was the father of Ômiya’in /tu (1225–92), principal wife of
Go Saga (Emperor 1242–46, Ex-Emperor 1246–72). Saneuji succeeded in
having the bakufu agree to an arrangement, which made Ômiya’in patroness
of the Munakata establishment, with Saneuji himself as supervisor.17 Ômiya’in
was an astute business woman and came to hold much land. She confirmed –
possibly against a fee – the heredity of the post as head priest of the Munakata
shrine. She managed to secure that the patronship fell to her descendants, in
spite of their rivalries over the imperial succession,18 and that the supervisorship
came to rest not with the rapacious Fujiwara, but with the scholarly, politically
less prominent, and less divisive, Tachibana clan of courtiers.
The Mongol attacks in 1274 and 1281 were successfully resisted, but renewed
attacks were expected. Bakufu and Court had continuous prayers said to
Buddhas and Gods. Ex-Emperor Kameyama (ruled as Ex-Emperor from 1274,
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16 Ibid., p. 472.
17 Ibid., p. 473.
18 See YASUDA Motohisa v:wx: “Kamakura bakufu”, in FUJIKI Kunihiko yz{,
Inoue Mitsusada (|}~ (eds.): Seijishi)> I (Taikei Nihonshi sôsho0.>
4, Vol. I), Tokyo (Yamakawa Shuppan Sha) 1976, pp. 303–307.
lay monk 1289, died 1305) came to favour the Zen sect, and in 1291 made
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his own retirement palace a Zen monastery, to which he donated his patronship
of the Munakata lands. Probably for strategic reasons, the bakufu, however,
gave the monastery other lands in lieu of those of Munakata.19 From 1302
the bakufu ruled the Munakata lands directly, under the nominal patronship
of the Imperial House. Within the bakufu, the overlords of the Munakata
lands were now the clan heads (tokusô C) of the Hôjô clan. Their rule was
tough: in particular, they increased taxation, partly for defence purposes,
partly to finance their own men; for the defeated Mongols left no land behind
to distribute.
This, then, was the situation in 1313, when the Code was promulgated. The
incumbent head priest and lord of the lands sustaining the Munakata shrines,
Munakata Ujimori CDs, had retired in 1312 in favour of his infant son
and the latter’s guardians (who were also Ujimori’s most trusted vassals),
possibly in order to improve relations with the Hôjô tokusô. What was trans-
ferred to the heir was land and landed income, comprising 496 chô  (1 chô
= 2,45 acres = 99.17 ar.) and 3 tan (1 tan = 1/10 chô) of shrine land, over
which the Munakata head priest ruled independently, except for tax obligation
to Kamakura, plus 42 chô and 2 tan of land (possibly more20) over which he
held partial rights, that is, rights of income as jitô, myôshu, or imperial
official. Thus, he held no unitary sway, but rather a portfolio of lands and
incomes, distributed over many villages in northern and northwestern Kyushu.
Therefore, he could only legislate in broad outlines, and had to consider the
rights of other, more or less independent lords, some of them deputies of
Kyoto nobles, some of them bakufu vassals in their own right, some of them
relatives of the family of the head priest, eager to share its privileges, and
some of them myôshu, all striving more or less successfully for reduced tax
shares, and direct ties to Kamakura. Only the emergency situation of having
lost since 1302 much of the factual freedom, which each class had enjoyed in
the preceding centuries when they only had the Court and absentee nobles
above them, and of now having to pay increased taxes to Kamakura, created
a situation where administrative reorganization measures were palatable. Yet,
rebellion would have been a possible outcome; and to prevent this calamity,
arms and horses were monopolized, and direct contacts with the bakufu
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19 ISHII / oboegaki, pp. 475–476.
20 Ibid., pp. 484–486 und Kokushi daijiten d>/, s.v. “Munakata Jinja” CDE*,
Tables.
prohibited.21 On the other hand, the principle that the lord should govern in
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and through his Council – consisting of the heads of the most influential
families within the Munakata clan, all appointed by the Munakata head priest
– was laid down, together with rudimentary rules for procedures and aims of
the Council’s work.22 During the Kemmu Restoration (1333–36), the Munakata
lands were imperial lands, but Emperor Go Daigo (Emperor 1318–39, the
last three years head of the anti-Ashikaga government in Yoshino), in 1334
left full powers of taxation and jurisdiction (ichien chigyô j) to the
Munakata head priest Ujitaka s and his male descendants. While the
“Northern” and “Southern” Courts fought each other (1336–92), local warriors
kokujin dB dominated the whole area, and even when Ashikaga rule had
become stable (1392–1467), the Munakata clan had to defend itself against
competing warlords, notably the Shôni clan. In the Sengoku period of Warring
Provinces (1467–1573), the Munakata succeeded in warding off the Shôni
and stabilizing the shrine territory (1561), though the size of the latter had by
then shrunk to l00 chô. When, however, High Priest Ujisada s~ died without
a son in 1586, Hideyoshi confiscated the Munakata lands, and enfeoffed
Kobayakawa Takakage  (1533–97), who had been a successful
army leader in Hideyoshi’s campaigns, with them. Takakage added 200 chô
to the shrine lands, but Takakage’s adopted son and successor Hideaki 
(1582–1602), who – though he was a nephew of Hideyoshi’s wife – switched
to Ieyasu’s side in 1600, recalled Takakage’s donation,23 possibly under
pressure from Ieyasu, who wanted to favour the Kuroda clan; its leader
Yoshitaka (1546–1604) was also a former vassal of Hideyoshi, but had
joined Ieyasu’s side earlier. Yoshitaka increased the income of the shrines.
His descendants ruled the Munakata lands until 1868, with the Munakata
head priests as their deputies. The Meiji government included the three Mu-
nakata shrines among the officially recognized and financed shrines (kanpeisha
*),24 and furthered the erection of branch shrines. These now number
about 9,000 (in many of these other deities, too, are worshiped). Like others,
the Munakata shrines had to fend for themselves financially after 1945.25 The
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21 See translation below, Articles 10, 12, and 13.
22 See ibid., Articles 1, 3 and 6, and the Epilogue.
23 Kokushi daijiten, s.v. “Munakata Jinja”.
24 Ibid.
25 See Ernst LOKOWANDT: Zum Verhältnis von Staat und Shintô im heutigen Japan. Eine
Materialsammlung, Wiesbaden (Harrassowitz) 1981, pp. 64–67 and 70–81.
post of head priest was still held by members of the Munakata clan.26
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The Code of 1313 seems never to have been repealed. It was, however,
superseded by new laws when the Munakata lands became part of first Hide-
yoshi’s and then of Ieyasu’s spheres of power. The Code – or rather the
tightening-up of administration following in its wake – helped, however, the
scattered and vulnerable shrine lands with attached income rights survive as
a political entity in the turbulent years between 1333, when the Hôjô regime
fell, and 1587, when Hideyoshi vanquished the Shimazu K clan and policed
Kyushu efficiently. The Code created a tradition for orderly, centralized
government in an area where competing warlords had, since the fall of the
Hôjô, ruled as they pleased. From the point of view of the evolution of civil
law there is little to be gained from the Code. But from the point of constitutional
and administrative law the Code was forward-looking, namely (A): Art. 1, 3,
6, and Epilogue: a sort of “deal” between Lord and Vassals, with “decent
government” promised in exchange for succession;27 (B): strict controls of
government income and expenditure (Art. 2, 4, 8, and 9); (C): concentration
of the means of violence in the government’s hands (Art. 12 and 13); (D):
making sure that the government always knew what it had promised vassals
and others (Art.4); (E): standards of probity in decision-making (Art. 3 and
Epilogue); (F) the beginnings of a ranking order of sources of justice (Epi-
logue);28 (G): the principle of the exclusiveness of official channels when
somebody wants to write to a higher authority (Art. 10). Of these, (A), (B),
(C), (D), and (G) seem to be new, (E) was known in bakufu legislation,29 and
(F) can be extracted from cases in bakufu courts, but seems to turn up in the
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1586 (see Kokushi Daijiten, s.v. “Munakata uji”), and in 1871 the Meiji government
denied any duty to appoint shrine heirs (LOKOWANDT: Die rechtliche Entwicklung des
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27 For premodern European parallels, see Arno BUSCHMANN (ed.): Kaiser und Reich. Klassische
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Nation, München (dtv) 1984, pp. 68–69, 119–120, 203, and 550–552.
28 See the work quoted in Note 8, pp. 206–213.
29 For the oath of the Kamakura bakufu judges, see CSSS pp. 35–37. There is a somewhat
dated translation of it by the present author in MN XXV (1980), p. 435.
30 See HAGA Norihiko {: “Ryôshu shihai to hô” Y, in Iwanami kôza
Nihon rekishi.>, Vol. 6, Chûsei  1, Tokyo (Iwanami Shoten) 1975,
pp. 169–210.
Munakata Code for the first time as a generalized statement.30 It is well
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known from European history that ecclesiastical institutions were pioneers in
the development of administrative organization, and it seems that this was
also the case in medieval Japan.31
2. Translation
Statute [Divided into] Articles345 (Kotogaki jôjô)
[Preamble]
Abiding by what was already ordered in the Great Placard (Ôfuda / ) of
the eighth day of the second [lunar] month of the third year of [the] Shôka ;
¡ [era], strict measures should be taken [to ensure that] the cult of the Gods
be zealously carried out, the service of the Buddhas diligently performed, the
shrines [of the Gods] renovated, the temples [of the Buddhas] repaired, and
the tasks of agriculture, land administration, and other [economic] matters
[be taken well care of].
Commentary: The word which I have translated as “Statute” is kotogaki
34, since here the legislator speaks of his own Code. A word cor-
responding to “Preamble” is not present in the original; but Ishii Susumu,
who annotated the text in his Oboegaki (see Note 11) and in the CSSS
(see Note 5), pp. 177–84, kept the first article outside his numbering
of the articles. This is reasonable, because the first article is by its
contents a sort of preamble. — In what follows, commentaries by Ishii
Susumu are marked “(IS)”. I only add commentary when the text has
a point which is historically remarkable. I have not identified simple
translations of old words, lest the commentary grow inordinately. Words
in brackets have no literal counterpart in the original. They have been
inserted to clarify the meaning – after all, the text was drafted by
administrators for others of their ilk – and the insertion seemed justified
either from the context or from Prof. Ishii’s annotations. The type of
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31 Buddhist institutions were early developers of an efficient bureaucracy, see, e.g., Mikael
S. ADOLPHSON: The Gates of Power. Monks, Courtiers, and Warriors in Premodern
Japan, Honolulu (University of Hawai‘i Press) 2000, pp. 53–63. Since land exploitation
tasks and security problems were the same for shrines as for temples, both modernized
their administrative framework, when their overlords or patrons demanded more resources.
statute is a combination of “orders by the local lord” and “deal with
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the vassals”; see Carolin REIMERS: Gesetzgebung im vormodernen Japan.
Rechtsgebote und die Ideen der Konfuzianisten in der Edo-Zeit
(1603–1868), Munich (iudicium) 2000, p. 47, note 63. — The above
remarks also apply to the articles after the “Preamble”. — The last
year of Shôka is Shôka 2. But the 8th day of the 2nd lunar month
came before the 26th day of the 3rd lunar month when the era was
retroactively changed into Shôgen ;w. Adding the information found
in Paul Yachita TSUCHIHASHI: Japanese Chronological Tables, Tokyo
(Sophia University Press) 1952, the era change date I arrive at according
to the Kadokawa Nihonshi jiten .>, 2nd ed., Tokyo 1989, p.
1379, and Herschel WEBB: Research in Japanese Sources. A Guide,
New York & London (Columbia University Press) 1965, p. 22, is
March 3, 1259, as the tentative date for the “Great Placard”, that is, at
a time when the Imperial Court had still much to say in the Munakata
establishment. Unfortunately (IS), the “Great Placard”, probably written
on a large wooden surface and hung up for all to see, has not been
preserved. —The injunction to maintain assiduously religious services
and buildings echoes the bakufu’s Go seibai shikimoku k¢£6 of
1232, Art. l, see CSSS, “Kamakura bakufu hô” p. 1, and the annotated
translation by Wilhem RÖHL in Oriens Extremus Vol. 5 (1958), fasc. 2,
pp. 228–245. Remarkable is the equation of Shinto and Buddhist reli-
gious duties; this was common practice, see Nelly Naumann: Die
einheimische Religion Japans, Vol. 2, pp. 28 and 151. The words
translated “the tasks of agriculture, land administration, and other such
matters” are kannô ika shomu zatsumu nado¤
¥¦¥§.Kannô
meant (IS) distributing fields and agricultural materials (tools, animals,
seeds) to the tillers. As for shomu, it implied “landed income”, see
ISHII Ryôsuke '(<=: Chûsei buke fudôsan soshôhô no kenkyû 
"¨©ª«¬Zef, Tokyo (Kôbundô) 1938, p. 6. Zatsumu im-
plied “income from chattels, contracts, and debts”, see SATÔ Shin’ichi
: Kamakura bakufu soshôseido no kenkyû ­®¯°«¬8
Zef, Tokyo (Meguro Shoten) 1946, pp. 66 and 121–129. There is a
summary of such technical terms in the author’s article “The Legal
System of Japan at the End of the Kamakura Period from the Litigants’
Point of View”, in Brian E. MCKNIGHT: Law and the State in Traditional
East Asia. Six Studies on the Sources of East Asian Law, Honolulu
(University of Hawai‘i Press) 1987, pp. 73–110. The overall message
by the legislator to his men in the “Preamble” is something like this:
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“Do not forget the old and still valid orders concerning securing agri-
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cultural and non-agricultural income!” This mentality came to full
development in the Sengoku age; see Reinhard ZÖLLNER: Die Ludowinger
und die Takeda. Feudale Herrschaft in Thüringen und Kai no kuni,
Bonn (Dieter Born) 1995, pp. 162–173.
Art. l. All and sundry who reside in the shrine [lands] shall obey the orders
of [my son and heir] Matsu Hôshi ±². Whoever disobeys the orders of
Matsu Hôshi, or acts contrary to the Council, must not, even if he is a
brother, or a relative [of our clan], be selected for a post as shrine priest or
myôshu, and must be immediately banished from the shrine [lands].
Commentary: The word for “all and sundry” is kô otsunin ³´B or
“untitled commoners”. Thus, everybody was a direct subject of the
Overlord, as in Ritsuryô and later in the Sengoku daimiates. — “Council”
is naidanµ. Only Munakata clan members could participate (IS). If
other trusted vassals etc. were called in to deliberate, the usual term
was hyôjô ¶·. Naidan members were also the guardians of the heir.
After he grew up he took the name of Ujinaga s¸, which he later
changed to Ujinori s¹ (IS). — The normal age for being “capped”
and obtaining the rights and duties of a grown-up was the completed
15th year (actually the 14th, since the year of gestation was counted,
thus one was considered to be one year old at birth). — A myôshu
after 1300 was no longer a tenant, but an owner-occupier collecting
taxes and exacting labour duties from the tillers of his land at least as
much as his superior, the kaihotsu ryôshu º»Y was obligated to
his superiors in Kyoto and Kamakura; towards the former the Kyushu
myôshu had more leeway – and thus more chances to make himself
wealthy and independent – than myôshu elsewhere in Japan. Yet, as
one sees from this article, it was the local lord, here the Munakata,
who appointed him, and could also dismiss him. For the development
of myôshu, see BROCHLOS: Grundherrschaft, pp. 90, 153–155, and
258–259. For their activities, see TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft,
pp. 91 in general and 104 in Kyushu. — From this rather Draconian
provision one sees that the Munakata Code was not a kakun ¼
(binds clan members only and works through moral suasion), but an
early kahô  (binds everybody on the legislator’s territory and
works through punishment); see KATSUMATA Shizuo: CSSS p. 497. Typi-
cal of a kahô is also that it is not casuistic, but lays down general and
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for the territory. — “Modern” statehood, which in Europe reached out
from the capitals (e.g. London and Paris), from the 15th century onwards,
grew in Japan from the provinces, and was not capped by a centralized,
absolute government until after 1868. Premodern Germany was rather
like Japan.
Art. 2. On arrears of land tax (nengu _½) and other taxes (saibutsu ¾¿).
As previously ordered, collection pressure (kashakuÀÁ) must be increased,
and the taxes paid [into our treasury]. Those [collectors] who do not obey,
will have [their] land (shitaji ) confiscated; it shall be transferred to the
peasants. Minor [negligence], too, will be proportionally punished.
Commentary: Shitaji is land in itself, the physical soil (while shiki Â
is the bundle of rights and duties going with administering it, and
chigyôj the exercise of rights over land, see TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale
Grundherrschaft, pp. 73 and 92, Note 103). The word translated “peas-
ants” is gesakunin ÃB. They may have been the actual tillers (IS).
See also BROCHLOS: Grundherrschaft, p. 259. The background was, of
course, the increased resource demands from Kamakura, since the
Munakata lands were now (since 1302) ruled directly by the bakufu,
practically: the clan head of the Hôjô clan. — The typical tax collector
was the myôshu. He was appointed by the Munakata, and he collected
for the bakufu and for possible Kyoto patrons, see TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale
Grundherrschaft, p. 91 and Note 92. If a negligent myôshu was deprived
of land, he would not only lose direct income from it, but also customary
rights to levy and keep taxes from the inhabitants of that land. These
taxes would then land in the coffers of the Munakata lord. What
mattered to the Munakata was revenue, in conflict cases possibly even
more than the upholding of traditional status pyramids. In this respect,
too, their rule prefigured that of the later Sengoku daimyô. The last
sentence of the article looks like an afterthought. For a destitute ex-
myôshu might resort to banditry, see Lorraine F. HARRINGTON: “Social
Control and the Significance of Akutô”, in Jeffrey P. MASS (ed.): Court
and Bakufu in Japan. Essays in Kamakura History, New Haven &
London (Yale University Press) 1982, pp. 221–250.
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Art. 3. On the Council
The Council members must make just decisions, and must swear a written
oath [to that effect]. If the Council members all agree, that is the decision. If
they do not, they must call in experts on [legal] precedents and discuss [the
matter] with them. If members give corrupt advice by alleging made-up
[legal] precedents, or [hinder decision-making] through not showing up, they
shall be expelled from the Council, and punished. If, on the assigned meeting
day [of the Council], there is no matter requiring discussion, the members
shall, nevertheless, repair to the Finance Office and discuss matters in general.
When [my heir] Matsu Hôshi grows up, he shall be induced to make decisions
that conform with reason.
Commentary: “Council” is naidan. “Just” is kenpô ni ÄT (IS).
“[Legal] precedents” is kojitsu År. The kojitsu experts were not
naidan members (IS). Kojitsu was not just a source of law and (proper)
politics; it was part of legitimacy for rule; see G. Cameron HURST:
“The Warrior as Ideal for a New Age”, in MASS (ed.): The Origins of
Japan’s Medieval World, pp. 209–233, in part. pp. 226–23l; and the
present author: “Politische Ideen der Krieger im 14. Jahrhundert”, in
Hôrin, Vol. 5 (1998), pp. 197–216, in part. pp. 205–208. Whether the
Munakata naidan resorted to voting by majority if they, having learnt
the kojitsu, could still not agree – majority voting was commoner also
in Japanese non-Buddhist councils than hitherto believed, see M. RÜT-
TERMANN: “Das Prinzip der Majorität (tabun) im japanischen Mittelalter”,
in Saeculum Vol. 48, Part I (1997), pp. 21–70, in part. pp. 36–37 – is
not stated. But I think they did. If the aim is a decision, the member
who does not show up, because he disagrees, should, in case decisions
can only be made with unanimity, be praised rather than punished;
and when all members know the precedents, there is no “sanior pars”,
thus one can vote. — The word translated “reason” is dôri Æ,
which in the Kamakura sphere of political discourse did not mean “the
principles by which the world runs” but “the basic value judgments of
the ruling class”; see the commentary to the Preamble, and pp. 97–98
in MCKNIGHT  (ed.): Law and the State, with further references. — The
word translated “Finance Office” is KômonjoÇÈ
. The middle char-
acter was missing in the original manuscript; Ishii Susumu, on the
basis of other documents, amended it. On the basis of Art. 4 and Art. 7
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he also found out the functions of the Kômonjo: the distribution of tax
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burden and fiscal policies in general; thus the most important organ of
the Munakata government.
Art. 4. On the tax officials in the villages, the rice [tax] for materials for
official repair [works], and [on] accounting for the income of [the properties
in] Haruke and Taku.
When the Finance Office sends [one who serves us] a document giving him
an asset or an order, [the Finance Office] must demand his receipt, compare
the [copy of the] document with the receipt, and [demand] accounts [from
the receiver]. No arbitrary allotment of assets must take place. If an office-holder
fails to produce [receipts or accounts], a deadline is set within which he must
pay back what he got. If he fails to meet the deadline, he will be dismissed
from his post, and a law-abiding person appointed [instead].
Commentary: Haruke ÉÊ and Taku :x were localities in present
Nagasaki-ken, rather remote from the Munakata central lands in present
Fukuoka-ken. In Haruke the Munakata held a jitô shiki	Â (i.e., on
the income side, income from jurisdiction and from land rent, see
TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft, pp. 76–78), and in Taku un-
specified income from land (tokubunË). Tables in Kokushi daijiten,
s.v. “Munakata Jinja”, show, however, that there were many other
localities where similar income collection difficulties prevailed; and
while Taku was a recent acquisition (1313), Haruke had entered the
Munakata portfolio already in 1255. So I think the reason why these
two localities were singled out would have been trouble with negligent
and / or dishonest myôshu. It makes no difference if we think that the
“Taku” in question was part of the Akama ÌÍ shôen in present
Fukuoka-ken (thus IS). — The addressees who have to acknowledge
receipt are called katagata Î5. The term turns up again in other
articles in which the legislator expresses certain doubts about full
loyalty to him (Articles 8, 9, and 10). IS thinks they were relatives of
the head priest’s family, and thus (independent) members of the ruling
group. There had been serious wrangling inside the clan in 1132 (see
Note 15). — As for the Finance Office’s actual way of making sure
that the recipient of its grant or order did not use the document against
the Office, maintaining, for example, that he had received no order, or
a smaller amount of grain or land than the document stated, the sure
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a copy of the grant or order. But the text does not mention any copy.
So possibly the receipt was written on the document itself (perhaps
while the Munakata messenger watched), thus preventing fraud; see
TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft, p. 304, Note 1. Both are possible
(Kumonjo no kakikudashi ni tsukite gegyô seshime, katagata no uketori
wo torite, kakikudashi to uketori to wo tsugiÇÈ
Z4TÏcÐ
jÑÒÓÔÎ5ZÕÖ×ÖØÐÔ4ÕÖ×ÙÚÛ[...]).
Art. 5. That the tax officials in the villages, the officers of the finance office,
the myôshu, and other office holders, must not arbitrarily put the farmers to
work [for them].
[This practice] must be stopped; [thus] this special commandment. Those
who disobey it will be immediately dismissed from their posts, and obedient
persons appointed [instead].
Commentary: The “Tax officials in the villages” are shokyô benzaishi
ÜÝÞ¾ß (IS). Kumon ÇÈ were normally shôen scribes (BROCHLOS:
Grundherrschaft, p. 254), but since Kumonjo was the Finance Office
in the Munakata domain, I have translated kumon as “officers of the
Finance Office”. “Other office holders” are sataninB, BROCHLOS:
ibid. pp. 269–270, and TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft, Ch. I,
Note 81, and p. 80. They were the lowest level of officials, just above
the farmers, but had, at least in Kyushu, less status than the myôshu.
“Farmers” is the word I chose for hyakushô, that is, free resident
cultivators who typically also paid the kuji Ç3 tax; see TARANCZEWSKI:
ibid. pp. 64–67, and KEIRSTEAD: The Geography of Power in Medieval
Japan, Ch. 2. Protecting their productive and reproductive power was
no mere Confucian commonplace, but part and parcel of bakufu land
policies, see survey in TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft, pp.
89–90. Since the Munakata head priest held gokenin status, he could,
however, requisition hyakushô labour rather freely, Lokale Grund-
herrschaft, p. 273, Note 2l. I would think, therefore, that the aim of
the article was not to protect hyakushô against excessive levying of
corvée, but to monopolize, within the legislation of the bakufu, the
right of levying it. Only thus could the Munakata head priest protect
the crucial tax base; lack of tillers rather than lack of land was the
typical Kyushu predicament; farmers fled into the mountains or took
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lords; the geographical conditions made it easier for them to do so
than, for example, in the Kinai.
Art. 6. On the increase of the land tax.
That is what the great complaint of our clan [to the bakufu] is [about]. We
have sent a representative to the Kantô to plead. Yet, in recent years, we
have indeed often given [our men] supplementary fields, or allowed them to
keep part of the land tax they levied. We must take it all back [so we] can
pay the full tax to the bakufu. If our complaint succeeds, we shall reimburse
[those affected]. [And] we shall plan, with the Council, [measures] for those
of our men who have [otherwise] no livelihood.
Commentary: Taxes had mostly become privatized, and now functioned
as land rents. The Hôjô levied land tax (nengu) and kuji taxes from the
Munakata not only for the bakufu, but also as private lords (ryôshu Y
). As for the tax terms, see IS, CSSS, p.180, top note to Art. 6.
BROCHLOS: Grundherrschaft, explains as follows: Nengu normally
amounted to about one third of the harvest. Nengu of paddy fields was
normally contributed in rice, and of other fields in fabrics, other products,
or even in money (p. 260). Kuji were taxes other than nengu. Kuji was
paid in rice, other products, labour, or money (p. 254). The kuji tax
base was normally persons rather than land, see Jeffrey P. MASS: The
Kamakura bakufu. A Study in Documents, Stanford (Stanford University
Press) 1976, p. 202, and for cases pp. 62, 80, 99, 101, and 179–180;
see also TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grundherrschaft, p. 237, Note 14, p.
240, Note 17, p. 244, Note 16, and p. 312, Note 14. Tillers paid from
sixty up to ninety percent of their harvest as total dues. Owners (ryôshu)
kept about thirty percent of the harvest, see Hans-Adalbert DETTMER,
s.v. “Steuern” in Horst HAMMITZSCH (ed.): Japan-Handbuch, Wiesbaden
(Steiner) 1981, p. 493. The rest of the dues went to patrons, bakufu,
the representatives of these on the land, and, diminishingly, to the
Court. Kyushu tillers survived because they paid no taxes on dry
fields, which were considered as part of residential land, see TARAN-
CZEWSKI: op. cit., pp. 133–134. — KôdenÇ:, the word I have translated,
from the view of those who served the Munakata, as “supplementary
fields”, were no longer “public”, but fields from which taxes were
due, see TARANCZEWSKI: op. cit., p. 228, Note 15 and p. 287, Note 11;
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their men to keep taxes which the Munakata, or the bakufu, could
have claimed for themselves; such largesse was now retroactively
rescinded. This emergency measure required (a) promises of restitution,
if the Hôjô reduced their new claims (there are no traces that they did
so); (b) relief measures for those who went broke; and (c) precautions,
such as monopolizing arms and swift horses, against rebellion, see
below, Articles 12 and 13.
Art. 7. On the labour and other duties to the Kantô Emissaries.
Abiding by the allocations [already] undertaken by the Finance Office, meas-
ures [to comply] must be undertaken without neglect. Those who create
difficulties will be punished with particular severity.
Commentary: The term translated as “the Kantô emissaries” is Kantô
(no) on tsukai kß. In 1302 the Munakata lands had lost their
immunities (granted 1217) from entry by bakufu tax and police author-
ities. The emissaries actually represented the Hôjô clan. Munakata
authorities had to serve them with labour and other contributions (IS).
Apparently, some Munakata officials had been reluctant to do so. The
contrast to the situation a century before, when the bakufu, though
already in Hôjô hands, protected the Munakata against intruding war-
riors, is striking; see the case from 1206 in Jeffrey P. MASS: The
Development of Kamakura Rule, 1180–1250. A History with Documents,
Stanford (Stanford University Press) 1979, pp. 214–215.
Art. 8. On [such of] our men who are [sent to] represent us, or on [other]
official errands, or on guard duty.
Those who are sent on a tour of inspection, or [to ascertain] the boundaries
of properties [etc.], should carry out their tasks with the utmost diligence. If
anyone makes excuses, except when he has [a colliding] duty to perform for
the bakufu, and refuses to go, it is the height of disloyalty, and will be
punished severely. [On the other hand], those whose service surpasses the
benefits which our clan gave them, and thus excel their fellows, shall be
rewarded for their great loyalty, even when their families [are due to] serve
us [anyhow].
Next, concerning guard service. The certificate of performed service which
the [recipient] official issues and [the certificate] issued by the guard officer
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shall be investigated and compared. [If it be found] that a guardsman has
112 Carl Steenstrup
been absent [from duty] five times [or more], he will be punished. And if
somebody who does not [owe] guard duty [yet performs it], it is – as formerly
ordered – [considered] a merit.
Commentary: The addressees are, as in Art. 4, the not quite reliable
katagata. — The guard duties were, above all, to man the fortresses
and walls built by the Hôjô against renewed Mongol attacks, and to
help the bakufu policing Kamakura and Kyoto. These duties were
burdensome, and undermined the power of clan heads over branch
families and that of principal heirs (sôryô Y) over younger sons,
see Jeffrey P. MASS: Lordship and Inheritance in Early Medieval Japan.
A Study of the Kamakura Sôryô System, Stanford (Stanford University
Press) 1989, pp. 97–10l. The Munakata had themselves to blame for
bakufu interference, because of their internal inheritance squabbles,
see ibid. pp. 140–141 and 234–236. It was difficult for the Munakata
and other Kyushu lords to keep their resources hidden from the bakufu,
since the latter had, in 1284, established an office of investigation (see
MASS: op. cit. p. 98) in Dazaifu °; its competences were subse-
quently expanded into a fully developed court. In the unpleasant crossfire
between Kamakura demanding manpower and their own vassals un-
willing to furnish this manpower, the Munakata used not only “sticks”,
but also “carrots”, as one sees from this article. Such “two-sided” (IS)
relations between lords and certain categories of vassals grew in the
14th century, see Thomas CONLAN: “Largesse and the Limits of Loyalty
in the Fourteenth Century”, in Jeffrey P. MASs: The Origins of Japan’s
Medieval World, pp. 39–64, in part. pp. 53–54; and TERADA Tatsuo q
:	: “Der Herrenwechsel der japanischen bushi im 13. und 14.
Jahrhundert”, in Hokkaidô Daigaku Daigakuin Kokusai Kôhô Media
Kenkyûka Gengo Bunkabu kiyô 
A/L/Lud
efÈR No. 39 (2001), pp. 199–222. — “As formerly
ordered” probably refers to the “Great Placard” of 1259 (IS); which
would fortify the idea that do ut des relationships between lords and
certain categories of vassals (tozama  in distinction to miuchi k
) began to develop already in the 13th century.
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Art. 9. [Only] the paddy office allocates [the right to requisition the use of]
coolies and relay horses of the villages.
As was already ordered in the Great Placard [of Shôka 3-2-8], the said office
[administers these matters] for our clan. But we have heard that in recent
years [clan] relatives and others have privately ordered [such] services. This
is most unreasonable. Now, a double-entry ledger shall be established in the
Finance Office, and every year both records of official travel shall be impartially
audited.
Commentary: The people concerned are, again, the not-quite-reliable
katagata. — The “Paddy Office” is Tadokoro:
. Its areas of compe-
tence were all matters concerned with rice-producing land; it was,
with the Finance Office, the most important Munakata government
office (IS). For the history of the term, see TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale Grund-
herrschaft, pp. 71–72 and 82. The meaning in the Munakata realm
corresponded more to that in Ritsuryô times than to that common in
medieval shôen, namely, a person of warrior status serving a shôen
lord with such tasks as measuring, mapping, registering and determining
the tax capacity of fields. — The word I have translated as “double-entry
ledger” is kata nikki.. Such a ledger is what the control function
demanded. The difficulty is that double-entry bookkeeping is not docu-
mented until the Tokugawa era. A filing-card system would also have
served the purpose well, and such were known since the Nara era, see
Franco MAZZEI: “I moduli sociali di base nel Giappone antico. Struttura
e funzioni delle famiglie (ko ) di registri anagrafici conservati nello
Shôsôin”, Supplemento No. 13, Fasc. 4 of the Annali del’Instituto
Orientale di Napoli, Vol. 37 (1977). Perhaps each office kept a ledger
(IS). But the article says that the nikki was to be located in the Finance
Office. — Unauthorized private use by powerful people of official
transport and information relay systems is known from many premodern
civilizations. Probably only the tally system – no horse, no coolie,
without showing an official tally stating exactly the aim and extent of
the tally bearer’s transport needs – really worked. But the hassle and
delay involved in supplying every pony express or runner with a tally
was immense; the ex-post control here laid down would have worked
preventively, since misusers would be found out, and punished. The
measure shows a certain administrative sophistication, but is not in
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parsimony would suffice as motivation. Real travel and information
control, like in the the Sengoku daimiates, only comes in the next
article.
Art. 10. On [influential people living on our] coasts and islands.
Bypassing the office-holders of our clansmen they dispatch messengers directly
[to the bakufu], [and thus] oblige the bakufu to give [these messengers] fish
and vegetables: such behaviour is very disloyal [towards our clan]; it must
cease. If there are persons who disobey, the official in charge must report
[them] to [my heir] Matsu Hôshi; that is obvious indeed. Families who are
close to such [offending] persons are not to be trusted.
Commentary: The word translated “office-holders” is satanin; see the
commentary to the fifth article. Otherwise, the article speaks for itself.
Art. 11. On access to mountain [lands].
Access to the mountains Yamaguchi, Tarumi, and Yamada is free. It would
be a hardship to the peasants if one prohibited access [to these mountains].
As to Byôbu-take, Gokurakuji-san, Mochiyama, Takayama, Teikenji-san, and
the like, they are [sources of] irrigation water, therefore [our] office-holders
should be told to forbid strictly [any] access [to them].
Commentary: All these mountains are located in present Fukuoka-ken.
IS has identified their modern names, see CSSS top note p. 182, and
the table in Kokushi daijiten, s.v. Munakata Jinja. — The peasantry
normally collected grass, fuel, and herbs in the mountains according
to ancient, permissive customs, see ISHII Ryôsuke: Nihon hôseishi gai-
setsu .>?@, pp. 312–313. The problem is, that the more
vegetation is taken, the less rain will fall, and the more river sources
will dry up, see Conrad TOTMAN: The Green Archipelago. Forestry in
Premodern Japan, Berkeley and London (University of California
Press) 1989, p. 38. Protecting the vegetation of mountains which are
sources of irrigation water was for its time a new and useful ecological
idea. It seems to have been grounded on observation, not on religion.
— The “office-holders” are, again, the satanin. — Outside the core
areas of Munakata power absentee Kyoto patrons had more to say;
their interest was logging, and the peasantry took grass, fuel, and
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protection of the environment, except where clergy, Shintoist or Bud-
dhist, enforced such protection for religious reasons, trees and plants
having, for the Buddhists, Buddha nature, and for the Shintoists, the
quality of deities and / or abodes of such. See Nelly NAUMANN: Die
einheimische Religion Japans, Vol. 2, p. 67; and SONODA Minoru, “Shinto
and the Natural Environment”, in John BREEN and Mark TEEUWEN (eds.):
Shintô in History. Ways of the Kami, Richmond, Surrey (Curzon Press)
2000, pp. 32–46.
Art. 12. On swift horses.
It must be ordered that the old law be followed without negligence. Trans-
gressors will be strictly punished, as there stated.
Commentary: The article probably refers to the “Great Placard”, but
does not repeat the contents (IS). From the context it is clear that the
idea was to reserve swift horses, important tools for war, for the
Munakata lords; which means, there were rules about who could breed
such steeds, who paid for it, how were the mounts fed and trained,
and, most important, how were those outside the ruling clan prevented
from breeding their own war horses. There is reason to believe that
the best war horses now had to be passed on to the bakufu, and that
therefore serious punishment would be meted out to those who did not
comply with the rules. Since horses were small, and shoeing yet un-
known, a horse big and strong enough to carry a warrior into battle
was a treasure.
Art. 13. On armour, other military equipment, and horses.
During the national emergency [military equipment] was distributed. But
now, under normal conditions, it must be stored in [our] armoury as in
former times. No permits at all to lend [such equipment] privately, even to
relatives or brothers [of our clan], must be given. The same [principle applies
to] horses.
Commentary: “The national emergency”, Tenka no on daiji Zk
/3 was, of course, the Mongol attack (1274 and 1281). Arms and
armour which the commoners could not normally afford had possibly
been distributed to them, in the hope that they would use them against
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Now this war gear was to be collected and stored in the Munakata
lord’s armoury again. A total disarmament of the farming population
would probably have exceeded the military and administrative capacities
of the Munakata, and would also have entailed difficult decisions on
who could keep their spears, swords, bows, etc., in particular the
myôshu, who needed arms to collect taxes from recalcitrant peasants.
A physical separation between warriors (into barracks, with arms) and
tillers (stayed in the villages, without arms) was not even brought
about by Hideyoshi in Kyushu; the continuation of “village samurai”
was typical of this area, also in Tokugawa times. What the Munakata
hoped to achieve was a reduction of the risk of rebellion by myôshu
leading their peasants into battle against the new and harsher tax régime
enforced by the Hôjô. — Possibly warhorses, too, had been lent to
such commoners as were normally not allowed to move about on
horseback, in order that they could fight the Mongols more efficiently.
The sentence about horses is not redundant, since obviously the 1259
rules about the war horse monopoly of the Munakata lord had not
foreseen the 1274 and 1281 emergency measures. The plea that normal
conditions had now returned was untrue. Warlike preparations were
necessary as long as the Mongols ruled China and Korea, and the
Japanese military leadership knew that. All things considered, I think
it is not justified to regard the article as a foreshadowing of the violence
monopoly of the early modern state. The latter introduced it for different
reasons, namely, to prevent the masses from rising while the prince
and his army were engaged in war against the neighbouring prince
and his state (France, Prussia, Russia, Manchu China), or to prevent
the resurgence of civil war (Tokugawa Japan).
[Epilogue]
Such are the articles [here laid down]. But if some matter is not mentioned in
this statute, one should indeed adjudge [the matter] according to other [legal]
compilations. This means, to follow the [Jôei] Code [of the bakufu]; or look
up precedents; [if no solution], to follow reason; [if still no solution], follow
what the present circumstances require; [thus prepared], [legal matters] shall
be brought before the Council, and the Council shall make just [i.e. unbiased]
decisions. It shall investigate, how shallow or deep is the loyalty or disloyalty
[towards our clan of the parties involved, and thus in the end] ascertain, are
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right and wrong, and the essence of ruling is to apply rewards and punishments.
— Thus ordered.
Shôwa 2nd year, 1st [lunar] month, 9th day ;]_; !.
Monogram (kaô"#) of Munakata Ujimori CDs
Commentary: A word corresponding to “Epilogue” is not present in
the original. But the contents show that this is the epilogue or conclusion;
and as to form, in contradistinction to the articles before, the superscript
does not begin with ichi , and the text not with migi $, ichi being
the signal that here comes a new topic in a rule series, and migi that
another rule went before. Both devices helped prevent fraudulent addi-
tions to texts. “Other legal compilations” probably meant the oft-
mentioned “Great Placard” (IS). The word translated “[Jôei] Code” is
shikimoku, that is, the bakufu’s Go seibai shikimoku, also called, ac-
cording to the era when it was compiled, Jôei shikimoku ~%6
(IS). The “supplementary statutes”, those we now call the Tsuika hô
&', are not mentioned. They form a modern compilation of what
was to contemporaries just new bakufu leading cases, see KASAMATSU
Hiroshi(±)* in the CSSS, pp. 479–490. Therefore it is not illogical,
when the text, after having told the officials to follow the Jôei code,
says, “or look up precedents”; for they would then land in the leading
cases which amended the Jôei code, and which the bakufu sent to its
judges, occasionally even compiled, and which now, beautifully num-
bered, make up our tsuika hô. What happened if the “Great Placard”
collided with a tsuika hô or even with a rule of the Jôei shikimoku is
not stated, but since the Munakata territories were now a bakufu area,
there is little doubt that the bakufu rule won. Thus, we arrive at the
following order of sources of law to be followed when the Munakata
officials prepared the brief of a case, and the Council adjudged it: (1)
bakufu statutes (2) bakufu precedents which had not yet been compiled
into statutes (3) Munakata statutes and precedents (4) “reason” (riÆ),
that is, practically, what the Council knew about customs and values,
and accepted as relevant and enforceable (5) what the concrete circum-
stances required jigi no osu tokoro +,Z-.
. On these bases the
Council was to make unbiased (kenpô ni) decisions. All this echoes
bakufu doctrine, see ISHII Ryôsuke: Nihon hôseishi gaisetsu, pp.
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Tokimune, but actually penned by an unknown Hôjô era lawyer ab.
1320; see transcription and translation in the MN Vol. 35 (1980), pp.
433–34, by the present author, amended by RÜTTERMANN: “Das Prinzip
der Majorität”, in Saeculum Vol. 48 (1997), p. 37, Note 38, and original
in the Chûsei hôsei shiryô shû (CHSS), Vol. II, p. 374. The directive
force of precedent, whether part of the ideology of the bakufu (buke
no narai) or sanctioned by history (kojitsu) or accepted as ratio decidendi
in a former case (bôrei /0) could be overridden if the institutions of
the surrounding society had changed (jigi no osu tokoro). This, too,
conforms to Kamakura doctrine. But what the jitô normally decided
on his own, though under some risk of appeal to bakufu courts (see
KASAMATSU Hiroshi: Nihon chûsei hôshi ron .>1, Tokyo
(Tôkyô Daigaku Shuppankai) 1979, pp. 138–145, and pp. 85–86 and
91 in Brian MCKNIGHT (ed.): Law and the State, the Munakata Code
leaves to the lord’s “council”, where the lord presided, but had to take
advice, and was a learner only, until he had become an adult (Art. 3 in
fine). That the legislator had here come under some pressure from his
barons is probable, though their influence is less clearly stated than in
the Rokkaku 23 Code of 1567, which is otherwise the classical
example of a deal between lord and vassals, with the latter as the
stronger party. See Markus RÜTTERMANN: Das Dorf Suganoura und
seine historischen Quellen. Untersuchungen zur Genese einer zentral-
japanischen Dorfgemeinde im späten Mittelalter (Mitteilungen der
Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens, Vol. 126), Hamburg
(OAG) 1996, pp. 402–404. In this respect, too, the Munakata Code
points forward to the Sengoku age.
3. Conclusion
The above document was signed on the ninth day of the first lunar month of
the second year of Shôwa, that is, February the fifth, 1313. This is in an era
which is often considered as the one during which Hôjô rule showed the first
signs of decay. No traces of such decay appear, however – the Hôjô seem to
have been in full control, though the Munakata resented their tax claims and
their meddling. Since the Munakata territory had strategical importance, and
the Munakata lords had gokenin status under bakufu law, there is reason to
believe that bakufu approval of the retirement, the heir, and of the guardianship
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least from the bakufu’s Dazaifu office. Such approval, however, is not men-
tioned, possibly because it would have been detrimental to the clan’s priestly
prestige among the believers in the Munakata deities.
The Code shows clear trends towards centralization of power at the top, of
administrative rationalization, and of gradual acceptance of hereditary rule.
Where necessary, the supremacy of bakufu laws and institutions is acknowl-
edged, but without ideological commitment, simply as political facts. Forward-
looking elements are (1) a sort of power-sharing between lord and leading
vassals (2) rule by the “lord-in-council” (3) efforts, albeit limited, to keep
order by means of arms control (4) a fairly clear formulation of the sources
of law and their ranking order (5) a clear formulation of the principle that all
inhabitants of Munakata lands, in particular the commoners, are subjects of
the lord-in-council, irrespective of who owns the land they till, and derives
income from that land, and (6) a certain trend to suspect illoyality among
influential individuals outside the immediate control of the lord-in council,
perhaps one root of what was to become the nationwide tozama syndrom of
institutionalized suspiciousness. In short, in this Code we perceive the transition
from the “medieval” power-sharing between various groupings of power-
holders (kenmon 45) to the Sengoku daimiates, whose administrative con-
trols, in particular the tax system, are much more rational and strict, and in
which all political power derives from the center.
4. Names and Terminologies
In the commentaries to the articles of the Code I have tried to supply, on the
basis of the annotations provided by Japanese scholars, such information as
makes the rather terse articles more intelligible. There remain, however,
doubtful points; and other students of the medieval local laws of Japan will
find that institutional terminologies vary not only with time but also with
locations. I have listed such matters alphabetically below, where they concern
the understanding of the Munakata Code.
One may ask, why bother with these terminologies? Local laws may provide
us with better information on actual conditions than laws issued by the bakufu
or the Court, because the centrally issued laws could only point out in abstracto
the abuses they were meant to remedy, whereas the local laws have to mention
the abuses in concreto, which is exactly what the Munakata Code does; but
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from their own experience, explanations of terms were unnecessary, and now
have to be laboriously elicited from other primary or secondary Japanese
source materials.32 To bring together what is known in the West about the
meaning of medieval legal terms and note tentatively where there is still
debate among Japanese historians, may save time for those who have access
to the resources for taking up work on all those medieval legal texts which
have as yet only been studied in Japan.33
Bôrei, which the Epilogue tells the Council to look up when statutory law is
silent, and which I have translated “precedents”, may (TARANCZEWSKI: Lokale
Grundherrschaft, p. 241, comp. pp. 226 and 227) include customs which are
followed but not yet litigated on. I stuck to “Precedents”, since there is
conflicting evidence concerning the precise meaning of senrei 60 (“judge-
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32 Hans-Adalbert Dettmer wrote the basic work on the Ritsuryô tax system, Die Steuergesetze
der Nara-Zeit, Wiesbaden (Harrassowitz) 1959 (Studien zur Japanologie, Vol. l), and on
the officials and their salaries, Die Urkunden Japans vom 8. bis ins 10. Jahrhundert. Die
Ränge. Zum Dienstverhältnis der Urkundsbeamten, Wiesbaden (Harrassowitz) 1972
(Veröffentlichungen des Ostasiatischen Seminars der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität
Frankfurt / Main, Reihe B: Ostasienkunde, Vol. 3). It is well known that many “feudal”
Japanese terms & titles were the same as in the Ritsuryô, but with changed meanings. The
above works remain the points of departure for research into institutional terms and their
meanings until Meiji. In the 14th century, Go Daigo’s statutes aiming at a Neo-Confucian
ideal state of things were short-lived, but show in a nutshell the political weaknesses of
the preceding period (the period where the Munakata Code came into existence). Carolin
Reimers translated and annotated these statutes in “Kenmuki. Aufzeichnungen aus der
Ära Kemmu”, in NOAG, Vol. 149/50, pp. 85–104. The Munakata would have profited
from the continuance of Go Daigo rule, and it shows some political acumen that Ujimori’s
successor in spite of that marched with the Ashikaga. For the Sengoku era see the bibliography
of Wilhelm Röhl’s annotated translations of Sengoku daimyô kahô  statutes in C.
STEENSTRUP: A History of Law in Japan until 1868, Second Impression with Corrections,
Leiden (Brill) 1995 (Handbuch der Orientalistik 5/6/2/1), p. 172. The late Jeffrey P. Mass
and his students all contributed to the last volume which Mass edited, The Origins of
Japan’s Medieval World, (see above, Note 4). There is hope that one of them will publish
a dictionary of medieval administrative and legal terms which Mass is said to have
planned before his untimely death. In German, a comprehensive glossary of such terms
already exists, in BROCHLOS: Grundherrschaft, pp. 220–294.
33 See list of extant Sengoku kahô by Katsumata Shizuo in the CHSS, pp. 498–499. In the
development line of territorial legislation from binding the army only towards binding
everybody on the territory, the Munakata Code can be said to belong to the latter type. As
for the typology of later such statutes, see KATSUMATA Shizuo with Martin COLLCUTT:
“The Development of Sengoku Law”, in John Whitney HALL et alii (eds.): Japan Before
Tokugawa. Political Consolidation and Economic Growth 1500 to 1650, Princeton
(Princeton University Press) 1981, pp. 101–124, in part. pp. 102–105 and 114–115.
made law”) versus bôrei (“non-written law”), see the analysis in KASAMATSU:
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Nihon chûsei hôshi ron, pp. 14–18, and since a bureaucrat would tend to seek
a precedent before embarking on the laborious fact-finding task of asking,
for instance, local elders, “What is the custom ?”
Gechi is another possible reading of , which I have read shitaji (see Art.
2) and interpreted as “land in itself”, “soil”. Among the meanings of gechi is
“humble people”. I stuck to “land in itself”, since putting the remiss myôshu’s
bondsmen to work for gesakunin would be an inefficient punishment: the
myôshu could increase the payments of the gesakunin, particularly in Kyushu
where many myôshu were entrenched local notables, see NAGAHARA Keiji:
“The Medieval Peasant”, in Kôzô YAMAMURA (ed.): The Cambridge History of
Japan, Vol. 3, Medieval Japan, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne (Cambridge
University Press) 1990, pp. 303–343, in part. p. 308. The Munakata lord’s
power over such myôshu would have been precarious.
KenpôÄ (see Art. 3 and the Epilogue), formerly read kenbô, meant “statute”
in the Ritsuryô era, “public administrative law” from the Sengoku era onwards,
and “Constitution” (read kenpô) from the Meiji era onwards, but in the
Kamakura / Muromachi era “without bias”; thus IS has interpreted the word
in his commentaries to the Munakata Code. This is reasonable, since the
Epilogue already demands obedience to usual legal sources. For the other
meanings, see s.v. kenpô in Nihon kokugo daijiten.d/, ISHII Ryôsu-
ke in Nihon hôseishi gaisetsu , p. 66, and RÜTTERMANN: Suganoura, pp. 303–304.
Munakata Ujimori who signed the Code can also be read “Munakata Ujishige”.
Shige (= “luxuriant”) was more auspicious than mori (= “abundant”). But the
recent and authoritative Nihonshi daijiten .>/ (Tokyo, Heibonsha
1994), s.v. Munakata shi kotogakiCDs34, reads the given name “Ujimori”,
and that will probably be the standard reading in the future. Though it is not
relevant to the interpretation of the Code, the question may reasonably be
asked how the Munakata territory fared under the successor (see commentary
to Article 1), who as a grown-up first took the name Ujinaga and then
Ujinori (IS). Not badly: the successor joined the ultimately successful Ashikaga
side in the campaign which ended the Kenmu Restoration in 1336, and thus
vanquished, with Ashikaga help, the then most dangerous rivals of the Munakata
clan, the Kikuchi 7, who supported the anti-Ashikaga “Southern” claimants
to the throne; see Nihonshi Daijiten, s.v. Munakata gun CD8. This choice
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difficult-to-defend possessions, of relative Munakata independence in the
Ashikaga age.
Nengu (see Articles 2 and 6) was originally the land tax due to the government
and was now the land rent due to the proprietor (ryôke) and / or to the noble
patron (honke). But what broke the farmer’s back were the kuji and other
supplementary taxes, in particular product and labour duties to the shôen
officials and to the jitô, because, in distinction to the nengu, they were
arbitrary and more or less unpredictable, see NAGAHARA: “The Medieval Peas-
ant”, pp. 317–323. The kuji seem to have developed from commuted labour
duties, see Peter Judd ARNESEN (an expert on Kyushu history): The Medieval
Japanese Daimyô. The Ôuchi Family’s Rule of Suo and Nagato, New Haven
and London (Yale University Press) 1979, pp. 105–106. But there are other
theories as well, see SATÔ Kazuhiko ]{ et alii (eds.): Nihon chûseishi
kenkyû jiten.>ef3, Tokyo (Tôkyôdô) 1995, pp. 64–66. As for
the interrelation of the the tax system with the development of the myô ,
and what the latter term came to mean in the various phases of the medieval
period, the most transparent explanations remain, in my opinion, those found
in NAGAHARA Keiji %9:^ et alii (eds.): Chûseishi handobukku >;<
=>?@, Tokyo (Kondô Shuppan) 1974, pp. 148, 153–156, and 158–161.
Careful Western-language presentations of the medieval tax system, including
its regional variations, are, for the ideological and technological foundations,
the works by Keirstead and Troost, and for the actual administration and
impact of the system, those by Taranczewski and Brochlos (for bibliographical
details see Note 4 above). A fascinating general survey in a Western language
of the exploitative nature of the tax system, with interesting details on Kyushu
conditions, is Nagahara Keiji’s chapter “The Medieval Peasant” in The Cam-
bridge History of Japan, Vol. 3, pp. 301–343, in part. pp. 315–323. On the
bakufu representatives in Kyushu, in particular, the Chinzei tandai %oA2
(first in Dazaifu, later even nearer, in Hakata BC), through whom the long
and often rapacious arm of the Hôjô also reached down to the Munakata
lords and their subjects, see ISHII Susumu: “The Decline of the Kamakura
bakufu”, in the same volume, pp. 128–174, in part. pp. 149, 155, 160, 205,
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